He cited the Supreme Court decisions in Attorney-General of Ogun State v. Aberuagba (1985) and Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2003) as affirming that legislative competence must be found in the Constitution itself and cannot be expanded by legislative drafting.

A legal practitioner and policy analyst, Opatola Victor, has raised constitutional concerns over the Federal Road Safety Corps (Amendment) Act, 2026, arguing that while the legislation seeks to improve road safety, it may exceed the legislative powers granted to the National Assembly under the 1999 Constitution.

In an article titled "Hawking and Preaching: Can the National Assembly Legislate on Everything?", Victor said the controversy surrounding the law should not be limited to whether hawking, trading and preaching in commercial vehicles contribute to road accidents. Rather, he argued, the critical issue is whether the National Assembly has the constitutional authority to regulate such activities.

According to him, Nigeria's Constitution does not confer unlimited lawmaking powers on the National Assembly. Instead, legislative authority is shared between the federal and state governments through the Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists, while matters not expressly assigned to the federation generally fall within the jurisdiction of the states.

He argued that this division of powers is a cornerstone of Nigeria's federal system and is intended to prevent the concentration of legislative authority at the centre.

While acknowledging that government has a legitimate responsibility to improve road safety, Victor maintained that good intentions alone cannot justify legislation if the Constitution does not empower the National Assembly to enact it.

Supporters of the amendment have defended the law on the basis that hawking and preaching inside commercial vehicles can distract drivers and increase the risk of road crashes. They argue that because the National Assembly has authority to legislate on traffic on federal trunk roads, the prohibition falls within its constitutional competence.

Victor, however, disagreed, insisting that legislative competence is determined by the Constitution and not by the desirability of the objective lawmakers seek to achieve.

He warned that adopting an expansive interpretation of federal legislative powers could open the door to regulating virtually every aspect of daily life under the guise of promoting public safety.

To illustrate his point, he questioned whether Parliament could also criminalise political discussions, loud telephone conversations, family arguments or other forms of passenger behaviour simply because they might distract drivers.

According to him, there is a point at which legislation ceases to regulate traffic and begins to regulate ordinary human conduct.

Victor further relied on the constitutional doctrine of characterisation, which requires courts to examine the true nature and legal effect of legislation rather than the label attached to it.

He cited the Supreme Court decisions in Attorney-General of Ogun State v. Aberuagba (1985) and Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2003) as affirming that legislative competence must be found in the Constitution itself and cannot be expanded by legislative drafting.

The lawyer also questioned the reliance on Item 63 of the Exclusive Legislative List, which empowers the National Assembly to legislate on "traffic on Federal trunk roads."

While he acknowledged that this power extends to matters such as speed limits, vehicle standards, licensing requirements and other traffic regulations, he argued that it does not automatically authorise Parliament to regulate every activity taking place inside commercial vehicles.

Victor further contended that the amendment criminalises hawking, trading and preaching without requiring proof that such conduct actually distracted a driver or created any danger to road safety.

He noted that a passenger quietly preaching or selling bottled water to willing passengers could still be prosecuted even where the activity neither distracted the driver nor affected the movement of the vehicle.

At the same time, he observed that other forms of passenger behaviour capable of causing similar distractions, including loud political debates, heated arguments and telephone conversations, remain outside the scope of the law.

According to him, this raises legitimate constitutional questions about whether the legislation is truly aimed at regulating traffic or is instead regulating selected forms of commercial and social activity under the banner of road safety.

Victor also pointed out that existing Nigerian laws already criminalise dangerous and careless driving, providing sanctions where a driver's conduct endangers public safety regardless of the source of the distraction.

Although he stopped short of declaring the amendment unconstitutional, he stressed that its validity is ultimately for the courts to determine.

He also clarified that his argument should not be interpreted as opposition to regulating hawking or preaching. Rather, he maintained that such regulation must be carried out by the level of government constitutionally empowered to do so.

Victor concluded that the debate is not fundamentally about hawking or preaching but about preserving constitutional limits on legislative power.

He argued that in a constitutional democracy, the question of whether the National Assembly has the authority to enact a law must always be answered before considering whether the law itself is desirable, stressing that the rule of law depends not only on good legislation but also on laws enacted within the constitutional powers of the institutions that make them.